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INDEFEASIBLE TITLE IN
BRITISH COLUMBIA:
A COMMENT ON THE
NOVEMBER 2005 AMENDMENTS
TO THE LAND TITLE ACT
By Douglas C. Harris*

I

n November 2005, as part of an omnibus statute to amend 11 different Acts,
the British Columbia government made several significant changes to the
Land Title Act (the November 2005 amendments).1 The government
announced that the changes to the title registration system would “ensure
immediate legal certainty of land title for a person acting in good faith, who
unknowingly acquired a fee simple interest in the property through a forged
transfer, provided the individual did not participate in the fraud”.2 In an effort
to assuage fears of those who had acquired interests in a system that, if it needed
to be fixed, had been somehow less than secure, the government’s information
bulletin assured the public that British Columbia’s registration system was
“already highly regarded” and “considered world-class”. The changes, then, were
to be understood as improvements to what was already a good title registration
system.
Whatever its quality, the title registration system laboured with uncertainty
over its central organizing principle. Did title registration in British Columbia
operate on the basis of immediate or deferred indefeasibility? The difference
between the two principles lies in the security they provide to the person who in
good faith acquires an interest in land based on a void document such as a forged
transfer instrument. Put simply, under immediate indefeasibility the registered
owner of a fee simple interest is immune to a challenge that the registered owner
acquired the interest on the basis of a void instrument.3 Under a deferred system
the registered owner of a fee simple interest only holds indefeasible title if he or
she is one step away from the fraudulent activity. A person who acquires an interest on the basis of a void instrument remains vulnerable to the claim of the person who has been wrongfully deprived of his or her interest.4
The language in the government’s information bulletin—“immediate legal
certainty”—suggests it intended to establish that British Columbia’s title registration system rests on a foundation of immediate indefeasibility. If that were the
intent, is that what the November 2005 amendments have done? Is it now
unequivocally clear that British Columbia operates on the basis of immediate
* I thank my colleagues who teach property law at the law faculties of the University of British
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indefeasibility? And if so, are property interests more secure as a result? This article reviews the previous sources of uncertainty in the Land Title Act (the “LTA”),
outlines the changes to it, and suggests their effect on those whose property
interests are affected by fraudulent activity. It begins with a brief description of
the manner in which the common law treated forged instruments purporting to
transfer an interest in land and then outlines the nature of, and different
approaches to, indefeasible title in title registration systems.
COMMON LAW CONVEYANCING
Under the common law, the transfer of property interests could be a complex
and risky undertaking in which the risk fell entirely on the purchaser. The foundational rule, captured in the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non habet (no one can
give that which he or she does not have), placed the onus on the purchaser to
confirm the vendor’s title. This involved tracing the chain of title back through
all prior transactions (commuted to all transactions in the preceding sixty
years) in an effort to establish that the vendor did in fact have the interest that
he or she was purporting to transfer. If any transaction in that chain were
invalid, the result of a forged document or fraudulent activity, then the vendor’s interest was subject to the claim of the person who because of the fraud
had lost his or her interest. The purchaser’s title would also be subject to the
same cloud. Similarly, if a good-faith purchaser acquired a property interest
from a rogue on the basis of a forged transfer instrument, at common law the
purchaser acquired nothing except a cause of action against the rogue. In short,
the common law protected settled interests in land over those acquired in good
faith under a transfer.
INDEFEASIBLE TITLE
Whereas at common law a forged instrument in the chain of title might undermine an owner’s interest, in a title registration system the principle of indefeasibility secures the registered owner’s interest unless that person has participated
in fraud to acquire that interest. Title registration systems do not protect rogues.
Even if registered, the rogue’s interest is always subject to the claim of the person wrongfully deprived of an interest in land. With this exception, title registration operates on the principle that the person named in the registry as the
owner of an interest in land is the owner of that interest. As a result, prospective
purchasers have to go no further than the registry to determine conclusively who
holds title. The effect is to simplify the transfer of property interests and to
reduce the risk for those acquiring interests. Title registration systems protect
the sanctity of the transaction; they provide dynamic security.5
Within title registration systems there are two variations of the indefeasibility principle: immediate indefeasibility and deferred indefeasibility. Under
the former, the person acquiring an interest in land holds indefeasible title even
if that person acquires an interest, acting in good faith, on the basis of a forged
instrument. In a deferred system, indefeasible title is delayed until the person

acquiring the interest does so from the person who is the registered owner and
is, therefore, at least one step removed from the rogue and the forged transfer
instrument. The following example provides an illustration of the differences.
B concludes a contract of purchase and sale with R for the fee simple interest
in Blackacre. However, R is a rogue who represents herself as O, the registered
owner of the fee simple interest in Blackacre. R forges O’s signature on the transfer instrument, which B registers. In a system of immediate indefeasibility, the
fact that B has dealt with a rogue does not matter. Once B registers the transfer
instrument, he holds indefeasible title. O, who has been wrongfully deprived of
an interest in land because of fraud and who now cannot reclaim an interest,
would receive compensation. In a title registration system based on deferred indefeasibility, however, B’s interest would be subject to O’s claim to recover title.
The purchaser who takes under a forged instrument does not acquire indefeasible title. To extend the example a little further, if B sold the fee simple interest in
Blackacre to C and C became the registered owner before the fraud was discovered, then C, who has dealt with the registered owner and therefore has not
acquired the interest on the basis of a forged transfer instrument, would hold
indefeasible title even in a system based on deferred indefeasibility.
In terms of allocating risk, the principle of indefeasible title protects the person registered on title at the expense of the person wrongfully deprived of an
interest in land. That protection might be deferred to encourage a purchaser to
ensure that he or she is dealing with the person on title, but even so, title registration systems mark a clear departure from the common law where the person
wrongfully deprived would recover the lost interest. It reflects a choice in jurisdictions with title registration systems to prefer the sanctity of the transaction
over settled property interests. The person deprived of an interest in a title registration system, but who would have recovered that interest at common law,
receives compensation from an assurance fund.6 Compensation rather than rectification must suffice in a system designed to facilitate transfers.
IMMEDIATE OR DEFERRED INDEFEASIBILITY?
In British Columbia, where the colonial government introduced title registration
in the 1860s,7 it has not been clear whether that system operated on the basis of
immediate or deferred indefeasibility. The source of confusion lay in the Land
Title Act, which appeared to point in both directions.
The principle of indefeasibility is established in s. 23(2):
An indefeasible title, as long as it remains in force and uncancelled, is conclusive evidence
at law and in equity, as against the Crown and all other persons, that the person named in
the title as the registered owner is indefeasibly entitled to an estate in fee simple to the land
described in the indefeasible title, subject to the following…8 [emphasis added]

To hold a registered fee simple interest is to have “conclusive evidence at law
and in equity” of ownership. The emphasized passage is part of the November
2005 amendments to the LTA. The added words do not change the meaning of
the section, but they do appear to clarify that it is the person who holds the reg-

istered fee simple interest that has indefeasible title, not someone who holds a
lesser estate or interest.
Fraud in which the registered owner has participated is one of the exceptions
to indefeasible title. Before the November 2005 amendments, s. 23(2)(i) provided that indefeasible title was subject to
the right of a person to show fraud, including forgery, in which the registered owner, or the
person from or through whom the registered owner derived his or her right or title otherwise than in good faith and for value, has participated in any degree.9

If the person on title had participated in fraud, then that person’s interest was
vulnerable. But if he or she had acquired an interest “in good faith and for value”,
even if he or she dealt with the party committing fraud, then the person held
indefeasible title. In short, the section appeared to establish the principle of
immediate indefeasibility. Although simplified, the meaning of this section does
not appear to have changed after the November 2005 amendments. The registered owner of a fee simple interest holds indefeasible title subject to
the right of the person deprived of land to show fraud, including forgery, in which the registered owner has participated in any degree.10

Unless the person on title is a party to the fraud, the registered owner of a fee
simple interest holds indefeasible title, whether or not that person acquired that
interest on the basis of a forged document. This is immediate indefeasibility.
However, the LTA also contained another section that apparently pointed
towards deferred indefeasibility. In establishing an assurance fund the LTA provided that a person who purports to acquire an interest on the basis of a void
instrument, such as a forged document, does not acquire that interest:
A person taking under a void instrument is not a purchaser and acquires no interest in the
land by registration of the instrument.11

This section, added in 1978, appeared to establish deferred indefeasibility as
the overarching principle in the registration system.12 The registered owner of a
fee simple interest who had participated in fraud to acquire that interest did not
hold indefeasible title (s. 23(2)(i)), and neither did the person who acquired
from a rogue under a void instrument (s. 297(3)).
These two sections, in uneasy juxtaposition across many sections of the LTA,
sent mixed if not conflicting signals. Section 23 appeared in the heart of the LTA
close to the provisions that established the other key principles of a title registration system: an instrument purporting to transfer an interest in land does not
transfer that interest until it is registered (s. 20); and notice of a prior unregistered
interest does not affect a subsequent registered interest (s. 29). Section 297(3)
appeared tucked away in the provisions on the assurance fund. Nonetheless, the section only made sense if it applied to the LTA as a whole, and the limited case law
confirmed this reading. In law, British Columbia had a title registration system
based on deferred indefeasibility.13 In practice, however, the system appeared to
operate on the principle of immediate indefeasibility: purchasers kept their newly
acquired fee simple interest; wrongfully deprived owners received compensation.14

IMMEDIATE INDEFEASIBILITY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA?
A provincial task force report in 2001 on the state of title registration in British
Columbia recommended changes.15 Among other things, the report suggested that
British Columbia should adopt immediate indefeasibility, at least with respect to
fee simple interests, on the grounds that it would provide greater protection for the
bona fide purchaser, reduce concerns about fraud, and generate greater public confidence in the title registration system. It also suggested, however, that the courts
should retain some residual discretion to rectify the title of the person wrongfully
deprived of an interest if to do otherwise was inequitable and unjust. In these circumstances, the innocent purchaser should receive compensation.
Four years later the government took a few tentative steps towards implementing some of the recommendations. In the November 2005 amendments the
government repealed s. 297(3) and added s. 25.1. Eliminating s. 297(3), which
provided that a person taking under a void instrument acquires no interest, seems
to confirm immediate indefeasibility in British Columbia. Coupled with the
renewed statement in s. 23(2)(i) that it is only the registered owner who has participated in fraud who does not hold indefeasible title, the new direction of the
title registration system appears clear. However, the new s. 25.1 reintroduces a
degree of uncertainty.
Section 25.1 begins with an assertion that registration does not assist the person who purports to acquire an interest in land, including a fee simple or lesser
interest, based on a void instrument. However, that statement is immediately
qualified for the registered owner of a fee simple interest. A person who acquires
or has acquired a fee simple interest “in good faith and for valuable consideration” is “deemed to have acquired that estate” notwithstanding that the interest
is based on a void instrument.
25.1 (1) Subject to this section, a person who purports to acquire land or an estate or
interest in land by registration of a void instrument does not acquire any estate or
interest in the land on registration of the instrument.
(2) Even though an instrument purporting to transfer a fee simple estate is void, a
transferee who
(a) is named in the instrument, and
(b) in good faith and for valuable consideration, purports to acquire the estate,
is deemed to have acquired that estate on registration of that instrument.
(3) Even though a registered instrument purporting to transfer a fee simple estate
is void, a transferee who
(a) is named in the instrument,
(b) is, on the date that this section comes into force, the registered owner of
the estate, and
(c) in good faith and for valuable consideration, purported to acquire the
estate,
is deemed to have acquired that estate on registration of that instrument.16 [emphasis
added]

This addition to the LTA appears to establish immediate indefeasibility in
British Columbia for those who acquire and register fee simple interests (subs.
2) or who already hold registered fee simple interests (subs. 3). The fact that
indefeasibility applies only to the estate in fee simple coincides with other sections of the LTA, discussed below, that treat the estate in fee simple and other
interests differently. However, unlike s. 23(2), which establishes that “indefeasible title…is conclusive evidence at law and in equity…that the registered owner
is indefeasibly entitled to the estate in fee simple”, under s. 25.1 the person
acquiring on the basis of a void instrument is only “deemed to have acquired that
estate”. This is an important distinction that may weaken the protection for fee
simple interests acquired under a void instrument.
“INDEFEASIBLY ENTITLED” AND “DEEMED TO HAVE ACQUIRED”
The fee simple interest acts as the cornerstone of the title registration system.
Once the owner of a fee simple interest registers that interest, the holders of all
other lesser interests register their interests as charges against the fee simple
interest. The LTA defines “charges” broadly as “an estate or interest in land less
than the fee simple”.17 Section 26(1) of the LTA describes the effect of registering a charge:
A registered owner of a charge is deemed to be entitled to the estate, interest or claim created
or evidenced by the instrument in respect of which the charge is registered…18

The holders of registered property interests other than the estate in fee simple
are “deemed to be entitled” to their interests; they are not “indefeasibly entitled”
to those interests. Based on this distinction, the courts have treated registered fee
simple interests and charges differently. So long as he or she is not a party to the
fraud, the holder of a registered fee simple interest can successfully repel the claim
of the person wrongfully deprived of that interest. This is the meaning of indefeasible title. However, the holder of a lesser interest such as a mortgage, which
must be registered as a charge, will always hold that interest subject to the claim
of the person wrongfully deprived of that interest.19 In fact, the rule is somewhat
narrower. If the registered owner of the charge acquired the interest on the basis
of a void instrument, or if there were a void instrument in the chain of transactions between the person wrongfully deprived of their interest and the registered
owner, then the registered owner of the charge would hold that interest subject to
the claim of the person wrongfully deprived of it.20 As a result, registering interests in land other than fee simple interests helps to secure their priority, but it
does not confer indefeasibility, either immediate or deferred. In British Columbia,
that status is reserved to the registered fee simple interest alone.
Does this use of “deemed” in s. 25.1—a word that was pivotal in the interpretation of s. 26—mean that the registered owner of a fee simple interest
acquired on the basis of a void instrument holds something less than indefeasible title? If the government intended the system to confer indefeasible title on
the purchaser who, acting in good faith, had acquired a fee simple interest on the
basis of a forged document, then why did it not use that language?

One scholar of statutory drafting suggests that “deemed” is a useful word
when it is used “to establish a legal fiction either positively by ‘deeming’ something to be something it is not or negatively by ‘deeming’ something not to be
something which it is”. However, it can also be “dangerous” by creating “ambiguity if the context raises a doubt whether the ‘deemed’ fact is to be accepted conclusively or is to be rebuttable by evidence”.21 This was the problem in the
interpretation of s. 26. Did the statement that the registered owner of a charge
was “deemed to be entitled” to that interest establish that fact conclusively or
raise a rebuttable presumption that could be overturned with evidence that there
was a void instrument somewhere between the person wrongfully deprived of
their interest and the registered owner? Evaluating these words in the context of
the LTA as a whole, which used the language of indefeasible title and “conclusive
evidence” to describe fee simple interests, the courts have held that “deemed”
only raises a rebuttable presumption.22
If “deemed” in s. 25.1 were to raise a rebuttable presumption that the owner
of the fee simple interest held indefeasible title, then what evidence might be
offered to rebut that presumption? With charges, evidence of a void instrument
is sufficient. However, in s. 25.1 that evidence is expressly ruled out. Notwithstanding a void transfer instrument, the registered owner of a fee simple interest
“is deemed to have acquired that estate”. It seems, therefore, that there is less
room for ambiguity. “Deemed” in the context of s. 25.1 comes close to establishing conclusively that the registered owner of a fee simple interest holds indefeasible title even if the owner acquired that interest, in good faith and for value,
on the basis of a void instrument. In short, it moves British Columbia towards a
title system based on the principle of immediate indefeasibility. Purchasers will
be protected even if they deal, unwittingly, with a rogue; those wrongfully
deprived of an interest in land will be compensated.
However, the government chose not to use the language of “indefeasible title”
or “conclusive evidence”, and given the judicial interpretation of s. 26, that choice
must be considered meaningful. It means, in the author’s view, that while the title
registration system in British Columbia is certainly not based on deferred indefeasibility, it must be considered close to, but still approaching immediate indefeasibility for registered fee simple interests. The fact that a purchaser of a fee
simple interest in good faith and for value is only “deemed” to have acquired that
interest when the transfer instrument is void suggests that there may still be circumstances in which that purchaser will not acquire that interest. Although protected, his or her interest may not be so secure as to be indefeasible.
CONCLUSION
After the November 2005 amendments to the Land Title Act, immediate indefeasibility must now be recognized as the informing principle in British Columbia’s
title registration system. However, the distinction between fee simple interests
and all other interests in land remains. The principle of indefeasibility still only
applies to fee simple interests; charges remain defeasible if based on a void instrument. Moreover, while the move towards immediate indefeasibility is clear, the

changes stop just short of adopting it fully. The registered owner of a fee simple
interest who has acquired that interest through a void instrument is only
“deemed” to have acquired that interest. The LTA does not establish that registered ownership is “conclusive evidence at law and in equity” of the registered
owner’s interest. Given the past interpretation of “deemed” in the LTA in relation
to charges, this is an important distinction. As a result, it still appears possible
that in some circumstances a court might defer the indefeasibility of title for a
registered owner who has acquired a fee simple interest in good faith and for value
from a rogue.
In terms of overall security of the title registration system, the changes reallocate risk rather than increase the security of the system. Any additional security
for the person acquiring the interest is offset by a loss of security for those who,
because of fraud, are wrongfully deprived of their interest in land. However, given
the structure of the assurance fund, which will compensate those who are wrongfully deprived of an interest in land but not the innocent purchaser who acquires
an interest from a rogue, the principle of immediate indefeasibility means that
the costs of fraud will be distributed throughout the system rather than falling
exclusively on the victims of fraud.
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